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Most theoretical  results  on optimal  auction  design
draw  crucially  on the  revenue  equivalence  theorem
(Vickrey,  1961).  According to  the  theorem,  the  first-
price  sealed  bid,  second-price  sealed  bid,  English  and
Dutch auctions  are  all  optimal  selling  mechanisms pro-
vided that  they  are  supplemented by an optimally  set  re-
serve  price.  The revenue  equivalence  theorem is  based
on the  following  assumptions:  the  bidders  are  risk  neu-
tral,  payment is  a function  of bids  alone,  the  auction  is
regarded in  isolation  of  other auctions,  the  bidders’  pri-
vate valuations  are  independently and identically  distrib-
uted  random variables,  every  bidder  knows only his  own
valuation  and is  uncertain  about the  other  agents’  valua-
tions  and  there  is  common  knowledge about  the  valua-
tions’  distribution.  In  this  context  common  knowledge
means that  everybody  knows the  common  prior  distribu-
tion  from where valuations  are  drawn,  everybody knows
that  everybody  knows, etc.,  ad infinitum.
In  the  paper  (Brainov  and  Sandholm, 1999)  the  com-
mon knowledge  assumption  about  prior  beliefs  is
dropped, but all  other classic  assumptions  are  kept intact.
In  particular,  the  assumption that  the  agents’  valuations
are  drawn from the  same prior  is  kept.  It  is  shown that
without  common knowledge  the  revenue  equivalence
theorem ceases  to  hold.  The failure  of  revenue equiva-
lence has significant  practical  importance since different
auction  forms lead  to  different  expected revenues to  the
auctioneer.
In  order  to  prove the  failure  of  the  revenue equiva-
lence  theorem,  a  simple auction  setting  is  considered.
The setting  includes  two risk-neutral  bidders  in  an iso-
lated  auction  for  a single  indivisible  object.  Each bidder
knows  his  own valuation,  but is  uncertain  about  his  ri-
val’s  valuation.  We  assume that  valuations  are  independ-
ent  and that  there  exists  some objective  distribution  from
which valuations  are  drawn.
The analysis  of  optimal  bidding  in  such  auctions  is
usually  conducted  using  the  Nash equilibrium  solution
concept  from noncooperative  game theory  (Nash,  1951),
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or  a  refinement  thereof.  In  such  an  equilibrium,  each
agent bids in  a  way  that  is  a  best  response to  the  other
agents’  bidding  strategies.  However, the  Nash equilib-
rium  solution  concept  relies  heavily  on  the  common
knowledge  assumption.  Up to  now there  has  been  no
satisfactory  equilibrium  concept  for  games without com-
mon  knowledge.  One cannot  derive  the  optimal  bids  in
the  first-price  auction  without such a  solution  concept.
Therefore,  one cannot calculate  the  expected utility  of
the  bidders  either.  Thus, we need a  solution  concept for
an  auction  game without  common  knowledge.
In  the  paper  we convert  the  auction  game described
above to  a  Bayesian decision  problem with  an  infinite
hierarchy  of  beliefs.  We  propose  a  solution  to  a  such
Bayesian decision  problem. The solution  is  a  generaliza-
tion  of  the  solution  of  Tan and Werlang (1988) and can
be applied to finite  as well as to infinite  belief  trees.  The
solution  coincides  with  the  standard  Bayesian solution
for  finite  trees  and for  trees  representing  common  knowl-
edge.
With each infinite  belief  tree  we associate  a  strategy
labeling  that  tells  what the  decision  maker would do at
each vertex  of  the  belief  tree  if  he were there.  We  iden-
tify  a  special  class  of  strategy  labelings,  namely, bal-
anced strategy  labelings.  The strategy  labeling  is  bal-
anced if  the strategy  associated  with each vertex is  a best
response to  the  strategies  associated  with the  successor
vertices.
The notion  of  balanced  strategy  labeling  serves  as  a
solution  concept  for  a  Bayesian decision  problem based
on an infinite  belief  hierarchy.  The concept of  balanced
strategy  labeling  preserves  the  central  principle  of  con-
sistency  in  the  sense  of  Hammond  (1988).  The central
principle  of  consistency  says  that  the  decision  maker’s
decision  at  a  vertex  in  a  tree  should depend only on the
part of the tree  that  originates  at  that  vertex.  The  central
principle  of  consistency  justifies  the  frequently  used
technique  of  backward (bottom-up)  induction  (recur-
sion).  The concept of  balanced strategy  labeling  gener-
alizes  the  backward induction  to  the  ease  of  infinite
trees.  If  we have derived  a  strategy  labeling  for  some
level  of  a  tree  we can "cut"  the  belief  hierarchy at  that
level  and apply  backward  (bottom-up)  induction  starting
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strategically  relevant  information,  since  the  concept  of
balanced labeling  guarantees that  the  strategies  along the
cutting  line  convey all  the  relevant  information  belong-
ing to the infinite  part of the tree.
With the  help  of  the  concept of  balanced strategy  la-
beling we obtain the  following result.
Theorem, When  there  does  not  exist  common  knowledge
about  private  beliefs,  the  revenue equivalence  theorem
ceases to hold, i.e.,  the bidder’s expected  utility  is differ-
ent for the different  types of auctions.
Therefore,  without  common  knowledge  about  prior
beliefs  the  fundamental  revenue  equivalence  theorem
ceases  to  hold.  The failure  of  the  revenue equivalence
theorem has significant  practical  importance.  Since dif-
ferent  auctions  yield  different  revenues,  auction  design-
ers  should be  careful  when  choosing auction  rules.  This
opens  promising  prospects  for  comparative  analysis  of
different  auction  forms using  the  solution  concept pre-
sented in this  paper.
Our approach is  related  to  the  work of  Gmytrasiewiez,
Durfee  and  Vidal  (Gmytrasiewicz  and  Durfee,  1995;
Vidal  and  Durfee,  1996).  They presented  a  solution
method  based on finite  hierarchies  of beliefs.  The recur-
sire  modeling  method is  based  on the  assumption  that
once an agent has  run out of  information his  belief  hier-
archy can be cut at  the  point where there  is  no sufficient
information.  At the  point  of  cutting,  absence of  informa-
tion  is  represented  with a uniform distribution  over the
space  of  all  possible  strategies.  The beliefs  of  order
higher  than  the  order  of  cutting  are  ignored.  This ap-
proach,  however, cannot be  applied  for  rational  agents
with perfect  reasoning abilities.  We  cannot prohibit  such
agents  from forming higher-order  beliefs  by applying  a
uniform distribution  whenever  there  is  no sufficient  in-
formation.  Once an  agent  has  run  out  of  information  at
some  level  of  beliefs,  he has also  run out of  information
for  higher-order  beliefs  while continuing  to  model fur-
ther  the  belief  tree.  Unlike the  method  of  Gmytrasiewiez,
Durfee  and  Vidal,  our  method  allows  such  extended
modeling  by  applying  a  decision-making  procedure
based on infinite  hierarchies  of beliefs,  and leads to dif-
ferent  results.  Put together,  their  method  approximates  an
infinite  belief  tree  by a  finite  one  while  our  method
solves the  infinite  tree  via a finite  tree  without resorting
to  approximation.
The solution  concept presented  in  the  paper can be ap-
plied  to  any game  based on infinite  belief  hierarchies.
For auction  games  it  can serve  as  a  theoretical  tool  for
analyzing expected revenue of  alternative  auction  forms.
Future work  includes  characterizing  properties  of infinite
belief  trees  that  guarantee that  the  solution  exists  and is
unique.
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